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Abstract
We study the situation of an exogenous decision-
maker aiming to encourage a population of au-
tonomous, self-regarding agents to follow a desired
behaviour at a minimal cost. The primary goal
is therefore to reach an efficient trade-off between
pushing the agents to achieve the desired configura-
tion while minimising the total investment. To this
end, we test several interference paradigms resort-
ing to simulations of agents facing a cooperative
dilemma in a spatial arrangement. We systemat-
ically analyse and compare interference strategies
rewarding local or global behavioural patterns. Our
results show that taking into account the neighbour-
hood’s local properties, such as its level of coop-
erativeness, can lead to a significant improvement
regarding cost efficiency while guaranteeing high
levels of cooperation. As such, we argue that lo-
cal interference strategies are more efficient than
global ones in fostering cooperation in a population
of autonomous agents.
1 Introduction
The problem of understanding and predicting collective be-
haviours of agents in evolving multiagent systems is a well
studied research topic in evolutionary game theory, as it
can be found in a variety of real-world situations, rang-
ing from ecosystems to human organisations and social net-
works [Santos et al., 2006; Sigmund et al., 2001; Tuyls
and Parsons, 2007; Raghunandan and Subramanian, 2012;
Han et al., 2017a; Sahraei et al., 2014]. In this context, co-
operation is typically assumed to emerge from the combined
actions of participating agents within the system. However,
in many scenarios, such behaviours are advocated and pro-
moted by an exogenous agent, which is not part of the sys-
tem, calling for a new set of heuristics capable of engineering
a desired collective behaviour in a self-organised multiagent
system. For instance, consider a wildlife management organ-
isation (e.g., the WWF) that aims to maintain a desired level
of biodiversity in a particular region. To do so, the organisa-
tion, not being part of the region’s eco-system, has to decide
whether to modify the current population of some species,
and if so, then when, and in what degree to interfere in the
eco-system (i.e., to modify the composition and the biodiver-
sity of the population) [Levin, 2000]. Note that since more
efficient population controlling typically implies more phys-
ical actions, which requires higher (monetary) expenses in
both human resources and equipment, the organisation has to
achieve a balance between efficient wildlife management and
a low total investment cost. Moreover, due to the evolution-
ary dynamics of the eco-system (e.g., frequency and structure
dependence [Santos et al., 2006]), undesired behaviours can
reoccur over time, for example when the interference was not
sufficiently strong in the past. Given this, the decision-maker
also has to take into account the fact that she will have to
repeatedly interfere in the eco-system in order to sustain the
level of biodiversity over time. That is, she has to find an effi-
cient sequential interference strategy that leads to her desired
goals, while also minimising the total cost of interference.
Although the (sequential) decision-making literature pro-
vides a number of techniques to tackle similar problems
where the goal is to provide a sequence of decisions that
lead to optimal behaviour of the system (e.g., the desired
level of biodiversity) while minimising the total cost of mak-
ing such decisions [Madani et al., 2004; Guha and Muna-
gala, 2007; Bachrach et al., 2009; Tran-Thanh et al., 2012;
Ding et al., 2013], these approaches typically ignore the fact
that the agents, with whom the decision-maker has to interact,
also have their own strategic behaviours that together drive
the (evolutionary) dynamics of the system. Given this, we
argue that such solutions will not be able to exploit the sys-
tem characteristics, and thus, will fail in providing efficient
performance in achieving the desired system status (e.g., the
status quo between the fighting opponents, or the desired di-
versity of population). On the other hand, game theoretic
literature, which deals with these strategic behaviours, typi-
cally focuses on the extremes of the problem. In particular,
researchers either assume that the system is fully closed (i.e.,
there are no outsider decision-makers) or the decision-maker
has full control over the behaviour of the agents. Typical
models for the former are classical (both non-cooperative and
coalitional) game theoretical models [Bachrach et al., 2009;
Aziz et al., 2010; Aadithya et al., 2011]. The latter in-
cludes models from mechanism design, where the decision-
maker is the system designer, and can define some set of
norms and penalties such that the agents are incentivised not
to deviate from the desired behaviour [Endriss et al., 2011;
Wooldridge, 2012; Levit et al., 2013; Harrenstein et al.,
2014]. Given this, these works are not suitable to meet our
current aims either.
This paper presents an alternative approach to address the
problem of the external decision-maker by combining the
decision-making process design with an evolutionary game
theoretic perspective. While the former captures the strate-
gic behaviour of the decision-maker, the latter can be used to
formalise the evolutionary dynamics of the multiagent system
and the strategic decisions within large populations exhibiting
arbitrary population structures and social tensions. In partic-
ular, we consider a multiagent system where the agents, dis-
tributed in a network, interact with their neighbours via the
one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), where uncooperative be-
haviour is preferred over cooperation [Sigmund et al., 2001;
Santos et al., 2006]. As an outsider decision-maker, we aim
to promote cooperation by interfering in the system, reward-
ing particular agents in the population at specific moments;
The research question here is to identify when and how
much to invest (i.e., pay the agents) at each time step, in
order to achieve our desired ratio of cooperation within the
system such that the total cost of interference is minimised.
We investigate two general classes or approaches of interfer-
ence strategies; the first is based on the current composition
of the population while the second is based on local neigh-
bourhood properties, in particular, for any agent being con-
sidered for investment we examine its current cooperative-
ness level (the number of its neighbours who will cooperate).
These two classes represent a large fraction of the sequen-
tial interference strategies in real–world scenarios, requiring
different levels of information in the decision making pro-
cess. While the first requires as input the overall population
cooperativeness, the second requires more detailed, local in-
formation regarding each neighbourhood to make a decision.
They represent two different approaches of governing and in-
centivising institutions: a large global institution overseeing
the whole population (such as the United Nations) as opposed
to multiple local institutions (such as regional or group-wide
ones) [Vasconcelos et al., 2013]. We are particularly inter-
ested in whether taking into account neighbourhood informa-
tion will lead to more efficient interference and how this may
be achieved.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the
next section provides a brief overview of the related work,
this is followed by a detailed description of our model, its
results and a final discussion.
2 Related Work
In the literature of evolution of cooperation, different mech-
anisms of cooperation have been studied, including direct
and indirect reciprocity [Nowak and Sigmund, 2005], kin
and group selections [Traulsen and Nowak, 2006], network
reciprocity [Santos et al., 2006], punishment and reward-
ing [Sigmund et al., 2001], and pre-commitments [Han et al.,
2017b]. These mechanisms are incorporated as part of indi-
vidual strategic behaviours, in order to study how they evolve
and whether their evolution promotes a better outcome for co-
operative behaviour. These works, however, do not consider
the influence of an exogenous decision-maker, but rather rely
on the changes made by internal agents. In contrast, our in-
terference strategies are external, i.e. they are not incorpo-
rated into the individual strategy. In addition, the aim of our
strategies is to minimise the cost of interference while guar-
anteeing high levels of cooperation, contrary to past literature
where the cost optimisation is often omitted. In this respect,
our work is also different from the modelling works of insti-
tutional incentives to encourage cooperation through costly
reward and punishment (see e.g., [Sigmund et al., 2010;
Vasconcelos et al., 2013]) as well as through enforcing agree-
ments [Han et al., 2017b].
Closely related to the current work is the analysis in [Han et
al., 2015; Han et al., 2014] where cost-efficient interference
is studied in well-mixed populations (i.e. having a fully con-
nected graph structure). Thus, the interference therein only
depends on the composition of the population. In the more
complex scenario of structured populations we consider in
this paper, agents might have different types of neighbour-
hood. As shown below, taking into account neighbourhood
properties leads to more cost-efficient interference strategies
than that based solely on the population composition.
Works on cooperation in social networks also assume that
changes are initiated from inside the system [Raghunandan
and Subramanian, 2012; Sahraei et al., 2014; Franks et al.,
2013; Franks et al., 2014]. Among them, more relevant to our
paper is the recent work by Franks et al. [Franks et al., 2013;
Franks et al., 2014], which has explored the use of influ-
encers on complex networks. However, these influencers are
also part of the system and thus, similar to the cases men-
tioned above, this work does not consider external interfer-
ence mechanisms. Given this, it does not address similar
decision-making problems that we examine here. Apart from
these examples, some other works apply schemes of mecha-
nism design to control the behaviour of the system. Endriss et
al. [Endriss et al., 2011] investigated how to tax games to in-
centivise certain behaviours in system equilibrium points and
Wooldridge et al. [Wooldridge, 2012] discussed the options
to manipulate games in order to achieve desired behaviours.
These works, however, assume that the decision-maker has
full control on the agents within the systems, which allows
her to both reward the good agents (i.e., those who follow
the desired behaviours) and penalising the deviant ones. With
our approach, the decision-maker has little or no control on
the agents so they can rely only on rewarding schemes, nudg-
ing agents to adopt a given strategy. Moreover, mechanism
design work typically does not focus on the cost of maintain-
ing the desired behaviour, whereas cost optimisation is one of
our objectives.
Last but not least, Bachrach et al. [Bachrach et al., 2009]
investigated how much investment into a cooperative game
is needed in order to ensure that a certain coalition structure
is stable. This work, however, only considers non-evolving
systems with a single time step, and thus, interference can
only be applied once. In contrast, in our system, due to its
evolutionary dynamics (and stochasticity), interference is re-
peatedly carried out over time (see the next section for more
detail). Thus, the related work (above) cannot be applied di-
rectly to our approach.
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Figure 1: Evolution of strategies over time (red for D, blue for C) and per-generation cost: (Two top rows) POP for different values of
pC (with  = 4:5); and (Two bottom rows) NEB for different values of nC (with  = 5:5). We only show 50 generations for the sake of
clear presentation. For POP: for small pC , the population enters cyclic patterns while when it is sufficiently large (close to 100% in general),
the population quickly converges to 100% of cooperation, avoiding cyclic behaviours. For NEB: when nC  2, the population converges to
a stable level of cooperation that needs to be sustained by constantly interfering in every generation. When nC  3, the population quickly
converges to 100% of cooperation, thus avoiding the cost of maintaining a stable state. Parameters: b = 1:8, L = 100.
3 Models and Methods
3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma on Square Lattice
Networks
We consider a population of agents on a square lattice of size
Z = L  L with periodic boundary conditions— a widely
adopted population structure in population dynamics and evo-
lutionary games (for a survey, see [Szabo´ and Fath, 2007]).
We focus our analysis on the efficiency of various interference
strategies in spatial settings, adopting an agent-based model
directly comparable with the setup of recent lab experiments
on cooperation [Rand et al., 2014].
Initially each agent is designated either as a cooperator (C)
or defector (D) with equal probability. Agents’ interaction
is modelled using the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
where mutual cooperation (mutual defection) yields the re-
ward R (penalty P ) and unilateral cooperation gives the co-
operator the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation
T . As a popular interaction model of structured populations
[Szabo´ and Fath, 2007], we adopt the following scaled pay-
off matrix of the PD: T = b, R = 1, P = S = 0 1 (with
1 < b  2).
At each time step or generation, each agent plays the PD
with its (four) immediate neighbours. The score for each
agent is the sum of the payoffs in these encounters. At the
start of the next generation, each agent’s strategy is changed
to that of its highest scored neighbour [Nowak and May,
1The results obtained in this paper remain robust when P is a
small positive value, resulting in a strict PD [Nowak and May, 1992].
1992; Szabo´ and Fath, 2007]. Our analysis will be primar-
ily based on this deterministic, standard evolutionary process
in order to focus on understanding the cost-efficiency of dif-
ferent interference strategies. However, we confirm that all
our conclusions remain valid for a stochastic update rule (see
Section 4.4 for more details). Namely, instead of coping
the highest scored neighbour, at the end of each generation
an agent A with score fA chooses to copy the strategy of a
randomly selected neighbour agent B with score fB with a
probability given by the Fermi rule [Traulsen et al., 2006]:
(1+e(fA fB)=K) 1, whereK denotes the amplitude of noise
in the imitation process [Szabo´ and Fath, 2007].
We simulate this evolutionary process until a stationary
state or a cyclic pattern is reached. Similarly to [Nowak and
May, 1992], all the simulations in this work (described in next
section) converge quickly to such a state. For the sake of
a clear and fair comparison, all simulations are run for 200
generations. Moreover, for each simulation, the results are
averaged from additional 50 generations after that. Further-
more, to improve accuracy, for each set of parameter values,
the final results are obtained from averaging 50 independent
realisations.
Note that we do not consider mutations or explorations in
this work. Thus, whenever the population reaches a homo-
geneous state (i.e. when the population consists of 100% of
agents adopting the same strategy), it will remain in that state
regardless of interference. Hence, whenever detecting such a
state, no further interference will be made. It is noteworthy
that the results remain robust assuming a sufficiently small
mutation rate, allowing the population to reach a stable state
before any new mutants arise.
3.2 Cost-Efficient Interference in Networks
As already stated, we aim to study how one can efficiently
interfere in a structured population to achieve high levels of
cooperation while minimising the cost of interference. An
investment in a cooperator consists of a cost  > 0 (to the ex-
ternal decision-maker/investor). In particular, we investigate
whether global interference strategies (where investments are
triggered based on network level information) or their local
counterparts (where investments are based on local neigh-
bourhood information) lead to successful behaviour with bet-
ter cost efficiency. To do so, we consider two main classes of
interference strategies based on the global composition of the
population and the neighbourhood information.
1. Population composition based (POP): In this class of
strategies the decision to interfere (i.e. to invest on all coop-
erators in the population) is based on the current composition
of the population (we denote xC the number of cooperators
currently in the population). Namely, they invest when the
number of cooperators in the population is below a certain
threshold, pC (i.e. xC  pC), for 1  pC  Z. They
do not invest otherwise (i.e. when xC > pC). The value
pC describes how widespread defection strategy should be to
trigger the support of cooperators’ survival against defectors.
2. Neighbourhood based (NEB): In this class of strate-
gies, the decision to invest in a given cooperator is based
on the cooperativeness level in that cooperator’s neighbour-
hood. While POP can be seen as a global interference strat-
egy, NEB adopts a local interference paradigm. Namely, the
decision-maker invests in a cooperator when the number of
its cooperative neighbours is below a certain threshold, nC ,
for 0  nC  4; otherwise, no investment is made.
In addition to these primary strategy classes, we consider
two additional advanced local strategies, assuming that the
external decision-maker can assess individual scores of play-
ers in a neighbourhood (e.g. an institution might have access
to individuals’ income records).
(NEB-i) Maintaining-C: for every cooperator, if the best
scoring neighbour is a D which has a payoff larger than that
of C, then invest an amount equal to the difference of the pay-
off of best scoring neighbour to that of C, plus a small amount
 > 0.
(NEB-ii) Maintaining-C plus influencing D-neighbours.
For every C we proceed as in (NEB-i). We then perform an
additional second step in which we lure D neighbours of C to
copy its strategy. To achieve this, if the highest scoring neigh-
bour of D is a defector, then invest an additional amount to
ensure that C has a higher payoff than that of the most fit D,
by a small amount  > 0.
Note that these interference strategies are increasingly
more subtle, requiring more information and so more de-
tailed observations of the population. In particular, POP re-
quires knowledge of overall cooperativeness of the popula-
tion, while NEB requires information about local coopera-
tiveness in each neighbourhood. NEB-i and NEB-ii need to
access the fitness levels of all players in each neighbourhood.
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Figure 2: Population-based (POP: top row) vs neighbourhood-
based (NEB: bottom row) interference, for varying per-individual
cost of investment  as well as the threshold of population coopera-
tion (pC ) or the threshold number of cooperators in a neighbourhood
(nC ), respectively. The left column reports the frequency of cooper-
ation while the right one reports the total cost required (normalised
by dividing by 107). Parameters: b = 1:8, L = 100; k = 4 (node
degree).
4b 3+! 4+!
D1 C1 C2
4b
4b2+!
2+!
3+!
43+!
4
4
3+!
3+! 4
4b
4b 2+!
2+!
3+!
4
3+!
4
4
3+!
3+! 4
(A)
(B)
(C)
- C - D - C or D
Figure 3: Typical cyclic patterns and stable configurations observed
in simulations. (A) POP strategies. D1 copies C1 if  > 4b   3
otherwise if 4b   4 <   4b   3 neither D1 nor C1 copies each
other, leading to a stable configuration, cf. the snap shot of a stable
population (b = 1:8;  = 4:1). When 4b   4 >  then C1 copies
D1. (B-C) NEB strategies where nC = 3. Cyclic pattern between
(B) and (C) configurations occurs when 4b 3 <  < 4b 2, cf. the
snap shot of the cyclic pattern (b = 1:8;  = 5:1). When   4b 2
defectors copy C, escaping the cycle.
𝞮to
ta
l c
os
t
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
20 000
40 000
60 000
80 000
100 000
120 000
140 000
NEB-HiiLNEB-HiL
NEB-3
NEB-4
Figure 4: Compare the total costs for different NEB strategies:
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observation is possible: NEB-i and NEB-ii. We vary , which rep-
resents the extra amount to the threshold value of  which guaran-
tees population convergence to 100% of cooperation for each strat-
egy. In general, NEB-3 is significantly more cost-efficient than that
with nC = 4. NEB-ii is better than NEB-i. Parameters: b = 1:8,
L = 100.
4 Results
4.1 Cost-Efficient Interference: POP vs NEB
We compare the population-based and neighbourhood based
interference strategies, i.e. POP vs NEB, namely their abili-
ties to promote cooperation while maintaining a minimal to-
tal cost. In Figure 1, we investigate the evolution over time
of the frequency of cooperation and the corresponding cost
required as per-generation for POP and NEB strategies, and
for different values of pC and nC , respectively. We observe
that for POP, the population converges to cyclic patterns for a
small pC , while when pC is sufficiently large (close to 100%
in general), the population quickly converges to 100% of co-
operation, avoiding cyclic behaviours. Cyclic patterns occur
since interference can lead to an increase in the frequency of
Cs; when this rate becomes larger than pC , it causes the in-
terference by POP to stop, which in turn leads to the decrease
of the frequency of cooperative actions and then causes inter-
ference to restart.
On the other hand, for NEB, when nC  2, the population
converges to a stable level of cooperation nurtured by con-
stant interference. When nC  3, the population quickly
converges to 100% of cooperation, thus avoiding the cost
of maintaining a stable state. Most interestingly, comparing
nC = 4 and nC = 3, we observe that the per-generation cost
increases for the former until reaching 100% of cooperation,
while it decreases for the latter. The reason is that there are
increasingly more cooperators requiring costly investment in
the former case while such a number decreases in the latter.
As such, NEB with nC = 3 has a significantly lower total
cost than NEB with nC = 4 while guaranteeing similar high
levels of cooperation (see Figure 4 for other parameter values
of ).
Next, for each interference approach (POP and NEB) and
threshold (pC and nC), we relate the stationary cooperation
level with the cost spent per-individual () (see Figure 2). In
general, the C frequency obtained by POP mostly depends on
pC – it requires a high pC (> 85% of the whole population)
to reach a high level of cooperation, turning POP a costly
strategy. For NEB, similar high levels of cooperation can be
achieved when nC  3 (comparing panels A and C). Con-
sidering the total cost minimisation (panels B and D), NEB
has a significantly larger area where a low cost is required to
achieve high levels of cooperation when compared to POP.
Thus, adopting a local interference strategy is largely more
efficient than a global population-wide paradigm.
4.2 Conditions for Cost-Efficient Interference
From Figure 2, we also observe that both POP and NEB
strategies require a certain threshold of  to be successful.
Next, we derive a closed-form expression for such critical
thresholds, for arbitrary b.
From Figure 2B we observe that, for POP to obtain an effi-
cient cost while ensuring high levels of cooperation (the black
area near top right corner),  must be sufficiently high. Our
analysis of Figure 3A shows that whenever   4b 3, differ-
ent cyclic patterns or stable mixed configurations are eventu-
ally reached. Particularly, when  is slightly less than 4b  3,
the population always ends up in a stable pattern, charac-
terised by a number of standalone D individuals surrounded
by C neighbours. When  > 4b   3 (i.e. when b = 1:8,
 > 4:2), cyclic patterns can be escaped, leading to a small
total cost and high levels of cooperation.
Similarly, from Figure 2D, for NEB to obtain an efficient
cost while ensuring high levels of cooperation (the black area
near top right corner),  must be sufficiently high. We have
derived the threshold of  for nC = 3:   4b   2 (i.e.
when b = 1:8,   5:2), see Figure 3 (panels B and C).
Moreover, since NEB with nC = 4 is equivalent to POP with
pC = Z — both mean always invest in all cooperators — the
same condition is obtained for these two limiting cases (i.e.
 > 4b  3).
We can see that the threshold of  for NEB with nC = 4
is lower than the one obtained for NEB with nC = 3 (4b  3
compared to 4b 2), which is also confirmed by the numerical
results in Figure 2D. When  lies between 4b  3 and 4b  2,
NEB with nC = 4 is more cost-efficient.
We confirm by performing additional simulations that the
two conditions hold for other values of b and are also robust
for different population sizes Z.
4.3 Comparing with Fitness Observation based
Strategies: NEB-i and NEB-ii
We compare the cost efficiency of NEB with nC = 3 and
then with nC = 4 where the conditions for their efficiency
(derived above) are satisfied, namely,   4b   2 and  >
4b   3, respectively. Abusing notations, let us assume that
 = (4b   2) +  and  = (4b   3) +  for the two cases,
respectively. This allows us to conveniently compare these
strategies with the more advanced ones, NEB-i and NEB-ii.
The parameter  represents the extra amount to the threshold
value of  which guarantees (close to) 100% of cooperation.
Figure 4 shows the total costs for the four interference
strategies for varying . They all guarantee high levels of co-
operation (100%) for  > 0. In general, NEB-3 is always sig-
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Figure 5: Stochastic update: evolution of strategies (red for D,
blue for C) and per-generation cost for NEB with nC = 3 (left
column) and POP with pC = Z (right column). Note that NEB
with nC = 4 is equivalent to POP with pC = Z. Similarly to
the deterministic update, NEB with nC = 3 has a decreasing per-
generation cost while that with nC = 4 leads to an increasing ten-
dency. As a result, the former leads to a significantly lower total
cost of investment than the latter one (namely, 2:2  105 compared
to 2:1 106). Parameters: b = 1:8,  = 3, L = 100, K = 0:3 (the
value of K was chosen based on suggestion from previous works;
similar results were observed for other values of K).
nificantly more cost-efficient than that with nC = 4. More-
over, assuming that it is possible to assess individual scores of
players in a neighbourhood, more cost-efficient strategies are
obtained. Namely, both NEB-ii and NEB-i are slightly better
than NEB-3.
4.4 Stochastic Update
We confirm that our results are robust with respect to the
stochastic update rule (see again Section 3.1). In particular,
similarly to the deterministic case, we observe that the lo-
cal interference approach (NEB) leads to more cost-efficient
strategies than the global interference one (POP). Namely,
NEB with nC = 3 is highly cost-efficient (while guarantee-
ing high levels of cooperation) – see Figure 5 for a typical
evolution of strategies and per-generation costs (and the total
costs) for NEB with nC = 3 and POP with pC = Z. Inter-
estingly, due to the stochastic effect (where there is a chance
that a higher scored individual copies the lower scored neigh-
bour’s strategy), it is easier to escape cyclic configurations
and reach full cooperation in the population. As a result, a
lower threshold of  is required to reach good performance of
the interference strategies (e.g. in Figure 5,  = 3 was suf-
ficient to reach full cooperation, compared to   5:2 in the
deterministic case). However, due to this stochastic effect, it
takes longer to converge to a homogeneous state (compared
Figures 5 and 1 where nC = 3 and nC = 4, noting that NEB
with nC = 4 is equivalent to POP with pC = Z).
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In summary, in this paper, we seek to determine how to effi-
ciently interfere in a spatially distributed system (i.e. a struc-
tured population) of agents to achieve a desired collective
state (i.e. high levels of cooperation). In addition to under-
standing the mechanisms underlying the emergence of coop-
eration in a multiagent system, we aim at identifying the most
effective strategy to foster cooperative scenarios. In partic-
ular, the cost of interference measured as the consumption
of (monetary) resources, and the greater impact we want to
make, the higher the cost we have to pay. To tackle this prob-
lem, we have combined different interference paradigms with
an evolutionary game theoretic model in structured popula-
tions, showing that local strategies (even their simplest ver-
sions) outperform global strategies in promoting cooperation
in networked communities.
In particular, we have systematically studied two major in-
terference approaches: a global paradigm which oversees the
status of the whole population when deciding whether to in-
terfere and a local approach which considers local properties
of a neighbourhood when deciding to intervene. We have
shown that local approaches lead to more cost-efficient in-
terference strategies. Notably, we have shown that a policy
which only invests in a cooperator if it has at least a defective
neighbour (i.e. NEB-3), is highly efficient, promoting sub-
stantial levels of cooperation. We have also derived the ana-
lytical condition of optimal thresholds above which it is prof-
itable to invest and confirmed the results are robust for other
stochastic update rules. Furthermore, we have demonstrated
that more advanced strategies based on neighbourhood prop-
erties can be achieved by assessing individual scores of play-
ers in a neighbourhood.
Our findings provide useful insights for decision-makers
in a large variety of application domains, ranging from drug
prevention programmes (e.g., the Unplugged programme of
Mentor-Adepis in the UK which aims to promote behaviours
that lead to the decrease of alcohol and drug usage among
the youth) and international educational aids to developing
countries (e.g., the Global Partnership for Education fund),
to wildlife conservation initiatives (e.g., WWF) and envi-
ronmental governance (i.e., how to promote and enforce be-
haviours that lead to sustainable environment among both in-
dustrial and domestic actors). According to our results, it is
better to focus on strategies which look at each individual’s
neighbourhood and support cooperation based on local infor-
mation, instead of using global observables as the primary
trigger for decision-making.
Note that this work may foster future studies of even more
efficient interference strategies. In particular, it would be in-
teresting to consider more adaptive strategies, which mod-
ify the amount and the frequency of investment dynamically
depending on the current state of the system. The anal-
ysis of the resulting systems, however, is not straightfor-
ward, as it remains unclear whether to increase or decrease
the amount/frequency of investments will lead to more ef-
ficient performance. Also, we aim to extend our investiga-
tion to systems with other, more complicated scenarios such
as heterogeneous networks and multi-player games [Santos
et al., 2008] where more behavioural equilibria and degree-
dependent strategies are expected [Duong and Han, 2015].
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